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This chapter asks whether deportation can be considered a form of forced
migration. It starts with a brief discussion of the concept of “forced migration” 
and the difficulty to distinguish ‘forced’ from ‘voluntary’ migration. A 
legalistic account would argue that deportation is not a form of forced migration 
because it follows the rules of law, while forced migration is a consequence of 
unlawful or catastrophic events. I argue, instead, that today the refugee regime 
in most northern countries is less geared towards providing lawful protection 
to persons in need than to prevent their permanent residency. The case of 
Germany shows, for instance, that less and less Afghans are accorded refugee 
protection although the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. 
Disregarding the danger for deportees, deportations to Afghanistan are 
enforced. Many volunteers and activists supporting refugees consider this as 
illegitimate or even unlawful and organize resistance and protest to prevent 
deportations. Deportations are not devoid of force. I conclude that also 
‘voluntary’ return migration can be a matter of force even if no physical force 
is employed. Here, the structural force of a refugee regime is at play that denies 
refugees a future in the country where they sought protection.  
Introduction 
When considering the phenomenon of forced migration, one assumes 
displacement to be a consequence of violence, natural disasters, or perhaps 
large-scale infrastructure projects. People who have to leave their homes 
because they were destroyed by an earthquake, by civil war or by the 
construction of a dam come to mind. Additionally, one probably tends to 
associate forced migration with countries like Syria, or, in the neighborhood of 
Pakistan, with Afghanistan, where for decades, people have had to leave their 
homes because of open violence, threats to life, and constant insecurity. The 
concept of forced migration is normally not applied to deportations from a 
country like Germany, where the removal of unwanted persons is supposed to 
work according to the rule of law. In this chapter, however, it is argued that 
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deportation can be considered as a form of forced migration. Drawing from 
real-life examples in this regard, the chapter discusses the politics of 
deportation from Germany to Afghanistan — an illustration of ‘forced 
migration’ that is particularly disputed in the former country. The chapter 
begins with a brief discussion on the concept of forced migration and the 
difficulty of distinguishing ‘forced’ from ‘voluntary’ migration. In doing so it 
is argued that nowadays deportation is much less a consequence of legal 
procedures than of political imperatives. The following section offers an outline 
of the German politics of collectively deporting Afghans in the context of right-
wing anti-refugee mobilization, pointing out that these deportations are based 
on the government’s assertion that Afghanistan is safe enough for refugees — 
a claim that is contradicted by all evidence. The sections that follow focus on 
the deportations from Bavaria as a federal state that deports Afghans with 
particular determination, and on activism and strategies to avert such 
deportations. The conclusion sums up and, reiterating the difficulty to 
distinguish forced from voluntary migration, points out that even ‘voluntary 
return’ migration is not devoid of relations of force. The article is based on 
long-term observation of deportation politics in Germany and on the analysis 
of media and official sources.  
Forced Migration and Deportation 
While forced migration is by no means a new phenomenon, academic interest 
in the subject is a more recent affair. Forced Migration Studies came into being 
only in the early 1990s as a supplement to the older discipline of Refugee 
Studies. There is an ongoing debate about whether or not Forced Migration 
Studies and Refugee Studies – or forced migrants and refugees, for that matter 
– should be considered separately. The argument for not collapsing both
categories is largely a legal one as ‘refugee’ is a category of international law,
defined by the Geneva Convention, while a ‘forced migrant’ does not fall in the
said category. Emphasizing the legal category, James Hathaway (2007) argues
against the trend to consider refugees as just one kind of forced migrant. As a
legal scholar, he limits the category of ‘refugees’ to those who have been
formally recognized as such by a state. He points out that refugees are special,
because they are exempt “from the usual right of governments to impose
immigration or other penalties for illegal arrival or presence […] which makes
absolutely clear that the refugee protection system is a self-operationalizing,
fundamentally autonomous mechanism of human rights protection”
(Hathaway, 2007, p. 354). Hathaway does not admit the hard-to-dispute fact
that whether or not a person who has had to leave his or her country is
recognized as a refugee in some other country is much more a question of
political context and interest than of categories of international law.
Furthermore, he asserts that forced migrants and refugees “in fact share little
other than the shared symptoms of involuntary movement” (Hathaway, 2007,
p. 359). However, it can be ascertained that most academics, except perhaps
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some legal scholars, would agree that the ‘shared symptoms of involuntary 
movement’ are nothing to belittle.  
In his critical assessment of the history of the disciplines, Chimni (2009) points 
out that the introduction of Forced Migration Studies followed mainly Western 
policy concerns i.e. that after the end of the Cold War, the vector of the 
predominant conceptualization of refugees turned from the east-west to the 
south-north direction. Policymakers in the ‘West’ (which had become the 
‘North’) were interested in schemes of governance that took into account all 
‘forced migrants’. It can be argued that legal protection was much less a 
concern in this context than how to prevent people from becoming refugees in 
the legal sense. Academic and governmental perspectives also turned to 
internally displaced populations, i.e. people not considered refugees because 
they did not cross an international border. Again, it is safe to assume that 
governmental interest focused particularly on preventing ‘IDPs’ from 
becoming ‘refugees’. Seen from the perspective of the affected people 
themselves, however, legal and categorical distinctions do not particularly 
matter so much. What counts for them is the perception and experience of 
fundamental insecurity and existential threats that trigger their move to places 
wherein hope for safety. 
Accordingly, most social scientists would not limit the concept ‘refugee’ to the 
narrow legal category enshrined, for instance, in the Geneva Convention. 
Instead, they would include refugees in the larger category of forced migrants 
(Castles, 2003). Casting doubt on the analytical value of the legal category 
‘refugee’, Castles argues that, for instance, a fall in the global number of 
refugees in the second half of the 1990s was mainly due to the “non-arrival 
regime” of refugee-receiving countries set up “to prevent refugees from 
entering and making asylum claims” (Castles, 2003, p. 14). The refugee 
category has largely become a plaything of political protagonists. In Europe, 
the ‘non-arrival regime’ largely collapsed in 2015, but in the subsequent years, 
governments expended a great deal of effort in raising legal and other barriers 
to reduce or stop new arrivals. In Germany, for instance, new ‘packages’ of 
asylum law were introduced that were meant to make the recognition as 
refugees in the country more difficult, to also discourage other refugees from 
entering the country. At the same time, legal and administrative provisions were 
changed to facilitate the removal of rejected asylum seekers.  
Force, thus, plays multiple roles in the trajectory of refugees, as it not only 
triggers the departure from their original places, and is often a constant travel 
companion, but it also operates to prevent them from reaching their intended 
destination. Force does not necessarily stop once the destination has been 
reached. In parts of Germany, for instance, asylum seekers are forced to live in 
particular accommodation centers, where there are kept in difficult 
circumstances, largely isolated from the local population. These 
accommodation centers are also intended to facilitate the deportation of asylum 
seekers in case of their non-recognition.  
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Are deportees ‘forced migrants’? The greatest difficulty in answering this 
question lies in one’s approach to analytically distinguish ‘forced’ (or 
‘involuntary’) from ‘voluntary’ migration. People who leave their homes for 
economic reasons are conventionally categorized as ‘voluntary’ migrants. 
Accordingly, the figure of the ‘economic refugee’ has gained notoriety in the 
northern countries of reception. They have come to be considered as ‘bogus 
asylum seekers’ who were not actually forced to leave their homes but 
embarked on migration just for their economic gain. However, that force is 
effective at many levels. This can be explained considering the concepts of 
violence; for a long time, structural violence has been recognized as a 
significant form of violence in addition to direct or physical violence. Structural 
violence works, as the term says, through social and institutional structures that 
result in life situations experienced as insecure and perhaps, unbearable. If a 
person makes an effort to leave, for instance, a situation of poverty and utter 
hopelessness, is this a matter of voluntary choice or of force? In such cases, the 
categorization of persons as ‘economic refugees’ is much more a reflection of 
the ‘non-arrival regime’ of the receiving countries than of the causes of 
migration.1  
In contrast to such cases, deportation leaves no scope for voluntariness once 
deportees have been apprehended. Antje Ellermann calls deportation “the 
state’s most heavy-handed weapon of migration control” (Ellermann, 2006, p. 
294). Deportees are forced to leave the country where they sought refuge, and 
they are often put in detention centers and, ultimately, forced to board an 
aircraft. At times also, direct, physical violence is used to achieve the goal of 
deportation. Deportees are then handcuffed and immobilized when transported 
to another country, sometimes with fatal consequences.2 Deportees are 
obviously forced to (re)migrate; they are (re-)moved. Deportation is “a form of 
an international movement that is all push and no pull”, writes Matthew Gibney 
(Gibney, 2013, p. 117), who then goes on to ask why is deportation thus 
normally not categorized as a form of forced migration? According to Gibney, 
forced migration is not just a descriptive, but also an evaluative category; ‘a 
term that is inflected with a particular normative framework’, namely that of 
the liberal state. In this framework, only people who have been displaced by 
some force that is considered illegitimate are considered as forced migrants. In 
contrast, Gibney continues to argue that the “deportation power in liberal States 
is generally viewed as a power that is correlative with the State’s right to control 
the entry of non-citizens i.e. immigration. The immigration control powers of 
States would indeed be very limited if States had the power only to prevent 
non-citizens from entering and not to expel them once they had arrived” 
(Gibney, 2013, p. 119).  
                                                          
1 On the discussion of force and volition in relation to migration from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, see Erdal & Oeppen (2017). 
2 In Germany, the case of Aamir Ageeb is notorious – a refugee from Sudan, who in 1999 died 
of suffocation because of police action on a regular Lufthansa flight. This case triggered a 
major anti-deportation campaign. 
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Accordingly, deportations are seen as working according to legal procedures, 
in which case the force of deportation is the legitimate force of the law. But 
even if one accepts the liberal state framework, the legality of deportation is by 
no means self-evident. In the case of rejected asylum seekers, Gibney points 
out, there is a very thin line between the illegal refoulement of refugees 
prohibited by international law and legal and legitimate deportation. This line 
“is determined almost entirely by the amount of procedural diligence a State 
shows in adjudging claims to protection” (Gibney, 2013, p. 125). In many 
countries, however, the concrete provisions of asylum law are obviously based 
much less on legal principles than on political imperatives (Scherr, 2015). In 
Germany, for instance, asylum laws have always been changed when it was 
considered politically necessary to reduce the number of refugees in the 
country. And laws have always been changed in a way that makes asylum more 
difficult. Asylum law is a clear case of legal opportunism, in that it is subject 
to other political considerations. In addition, the procedural application of the 
law is often questionable or outright faulty. This is clearly expressed by 
statistics; while in 2015 some 78 percent of Afghan asylum seekers were 
accorded protection (either asylum or subsidiary protection) by the German 
Federal Agency for Asylum and Refugees (Bundesamt für Asyl und 
Flüchtlinge, BAMF). This rate dropped to 61 percent in 2016 and 47 percent in 
2017 (Pro Asyl, 2019). This rapid decrease is not the result of an improvement 
in Afghanistan’s security situation, and therefore a reduced need for protection 
– the situation in Afghanistan did not improve at all, as was evident –, but of 
increasingly restrictive asylum policies. It is the result of the German 
government’s ‘deterrence strategy’, intended to prevent further immigration 
from Afghanistan and to limit the chances of protection for those who have 
reached Germany (Pro Asyl, 2018). At a meeting in Brussels in November 
2015, the German Federal Minister of the Interior said, “At the moment, our 
concern is the great number of refugees from Afghanistan. We want to send the 
signal to Afghanistan, Stay there! We will return you directly from Europe to 
Afghanistan!” (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2015). The minister clearly 
was not speaking of law but politics. This politics, however, is turned into law. 
Such political imperatives have resulted in a highly uneven situation for Afghan 
refugees in Europe. According to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE), Afghans have “faced the largest variation in recognition rates in 
Europe, with the rate varying from 6 percent to 98 percent, depending on the 
country, with no apparent reason for the divergence lying in the nature of the 
cases” (ECRE, 2019, p. 1).3 In Germany, 60 percent of the negative asylum 
decisions by the BAMF that were challenged before a court were corrected, and 
the claimants were accorded protection by the court (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
2018a). In the first six months of 2019, the BAMF gave only 2,667 Afghan 
                                                          
3 See also Kooijman (2018) and Parussel (2018), who present slightly different figures but the 
same overall image.  
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refugees the right to stay, while in the same period the courts accorded 
protection to 4,485 Afghans.4  
Nevertheless, not all court decisions are straightforward.5 Overall, asylum in 
Europe often seems to be much more a matter of luck than a matter of law, and 
this applies to the deportation of rejected asylum seekers, as only a small 
number of all rejected persons are actually expatriated. Accordingly, at the end 
of his discussion of whether deportation is a form of forced migration or not, 
Matthew Gibney affirmed that the procedures often fall below the basic 
standards of liberal justice (Gibney, 2013, p. 125). He concludes that while his 
argumentation does not prove that deportations are always an illegitimate 
practice, one cannot simply assume that it is a legitimate practice and therefore 
distinct from forced migration (Gibney, 2013, p. 128). Natalie Peutz adds that 
while experiences of forced migration and of forced removal may be analogous, 
deportees are perhaps sometimes worse off than other forced migrants: 
“Refugees and migrants are controlled and ‘protected’ populations; while they 
lack a political voice, they remain relatively visible within the public sphere. 
Removed persons are unaided and unprotected — a superfluous reminder that 
some would rather erase than have to account for” (Peutz, 2006, p. 240). It is 
not surprising then, that deportations are highly contested —  particularly to a 
country like Afghanistan, where deportees are returned and left to a highly 
insecure environment and where the legitimacy of deportation is particularly 
doubtful.  
German Politics of Deporting Afghans6 
While migration from Afghanistan to Germany started with students and carpet 
traders in the 1950s, the inflow picked up with the arrival of the first refugees 
after the Soviet invasion of the country. Since then, every new twist of conflict 
in Afghanistan has taken more Afghan asylum seekers to Germany. The latest 
peak came in the summer of migration in 2015. In 2016, Afghans filed 127,012 
applications for asylum in Germany (BAMF, 2017, p. 24), and altogether, 
around 250,000 were living in Germany by 2017, when the government tried 
to reduce this figure.7 Subsequently, the protection quota for Afghans decreased 
dramatically, as established in the previous section, and deportations were 
considered as an important instrument in this regard.  
In December 2002, i.e. one year after NATO troops, including German troops, 
had started their ISAF engagement in Afghanistan, the conference of the 
ministers of interior affairs, both of the federal government and the German 
                                                          
4 See Tageszeitung (2019). The court figure also includes cases from the previous year.  
5 One significant issue is the juridical construction of “danger” (Tiedemann, 2016). 
6 Part of the following is based on Sökefeld, 2019. 
7 There are many more persons of Afghan origin in Germany as already in 2004, 40 per cent of 




federal states, decided that deportations to Afghanistan would be suspended 
because of the (in)security situation in Afghanistan. Only criminal offenders 
were exempt from this general suspension, and so only sporadic deportations 
of Afghans with a criminal record took place. From 2013 to 2015, for instance, 
fewer than ten Afghans were deported per year. From 2015, given the pressure 
and electoral success of right-wing factions mobilizing against refugees in 
Germany, the federal and several federal state (Bundesländer) governments 
were keen to reduce the number of Afghans by increasing deportations and 
remigration. The government of Bavaria stood at the forefront of this move, 
together with the federal government. Arguing that parts of Afghanistan were 
safe enough for deportees — also because of the efforts of German troops to 
enhance security in the country — the federal government signed a ‘Joint 
Declaration of Intent on Cooperation in the Field of Migration’ in October 2016 
with the government of Afghanistan. This declaration was an agreement for the 
readmission of refugees, and it referred to the German contributions made to 
‘Afghanistan’s development and civilian reconstruction effort including the 
establishment of a high-quality education system, and water and energy 
supply’, emphasizing Germany’s ‘significant support for Afghanistan to build 
up its military and police force.’ The declaration reiterated commitment to the 
protection of asylum seekers and refugee rights, stipulating that humanitarian 
conditions and individual threats to possible returnees would be taken into 
account, and it specified that voluntary return should be preferred to 
deportations.8 According to the German magazine Der Spiegel, the German 
government had threatened to suspend its development aid of several hundred 
million Euros per year if the Afghan government would not sign the agreement 
(Spiegel Online, 2016b). Similarly, the European Union (EU) threatened to 
make its aid to Afghanistan ‘migration-sensitive’ by “linking it to the [Afghan] 
Government’s policy on migration and return and possibly to the 
implementation of the ‘Joint Way Forward’”, as revealed through a leaked EU 
‘non-paper’ on EU-Afghan cooperation (European Commission, 2016; The 
Guardian, 2016). 
Two months later, on December 14, 2016, the first Sammelabschiebung 
(collective deportation) from Germany took place when 34 Afghans were put 
on a special chartered flight from Frankfurt to Kabul. Originally, the 
deportation of 50 persons had been planned, but some were spared following 
emergency appeals to the courts (Spiegel Online, 2016a). On 4th December 
2019, the 30th collective deportation took place and by that mark altogether 
exactly 800 persons had then been deported this way since December 2016.9  
Following the devastating bombing of the German Embassy in Kabul on 31st 
May 2017, which killed at least 150 people and wounded more than 300 
(Spiegel Online, 2017a; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2017a), the critical debate about 
                                                          





deportations to Afghanistan gained momentum. A Sammelabschiebung that 
had been scheduled for take-off on the very day of the bomb attack was called 
off, albeit — officially — not because of the increasing insecurity in 
Afghanistan but because the German embassy was not operative (Tagesspiegel, 
2017). The federal government refused to issue a general ban of deportations 
but limited potential deportees to persons with a criminal record, potential 
terrorists, and persons who were considered as refusing to clarify their identity 
(Spiegel Online, 2017b).   
Deportations of such persons continued, and limited restrictions were lifted 
after the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a new security assessment 
of Afghanistan in summer 2018. On 6th June that year, Chancellor Angela 
Merkel declared in the Parliament that Afghanistan, or at least Kabul, was safe 
enough for the deportees (Spiegel Online, 2018a) even though the country, and 
especially its capital, continued to be hit by deadly bomb attacks. The WHO 
sees Afghanistan as “one of the most dangerous and crisis-ridden countries in 
the world” (WHO, 2017), while the Global Peace Index 2018 ranks 
Afghanistan 162nd out of 163 countries (Vision of Humanity, 2018). United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) concluded that “given 
the current security, human rights and humanitarian situation in Kabul, an 
International Flight Alternative (IFA) or an International Relocation 
Alternative (IRA) is generally not available in the city” (UNHCR, 2018, p. 
114), thus contradicting the statements of the German government and the 
decisions made by German courts contending the Afghan capital to be safe 
enough for the deportees. In her very elaborate expert report on the security 
situation of deportees in Afghanistan, the German anthropologist Friederike 
Stahlmann points out that they are particularly vulnerable because they mostly 
lack the dense family networks that are a prerequisite for both securing a 
livelihood and general protection in the country (Stahlmann, 2018, p. 152; 
Stahlmann, 2017). Deportees from Germany are in particular danger because 
they are targeted as deportees – as persons that have been ‘contaminated’ by 
the West. The German government’s frequent proclamations that mostly 
criminal offenders etc. are deported adds to this notion because returnees are 
suspiciously perceived as criminals in Afghanistan, although these 
proclamations are mostly false and the majority of deportees has no criminal 
record at all. For instance, 50 out of the 69 persons that were deported on 3rd 
July 2018, and who gained certain notoriety because the Federal Minister of the 
Interior boasted in a press conference that 69 persons were deported on his 69th 
birthday, had not committed any criminal offense (Tagesschau.de, 2018). Most 
returnees live under constant fear, even if they are not personally threatened, 
and many hide somewhere and do not dare to go out (Oeppen & Majidi, 2015, 
p. 3). According to long-term research by Schuster and Majidi (2013), these 
conditions force returnees and deportees to leave Afghanistan again — and as 
soon as possible. In a recent study, Stahlmann determined that 90 percent of all 
deportees suffer violence within two months of their return to Afghanistan, with 
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more than half of them being specifically targeted as a result of their 
deportee/returnee status (Stahlmann, 2019, p. 278).  
Together with the federal government, the Bavarian state government 
particularly puts a great deal of effort into effecting deportations to 
Afghanistan. In the German political and legal set-up, the federal states are 
responsible for the implementation of deportations. The great majority of 
deportees are deported from Bavaria, while the other federal states are much 
more restrained in this regard. In fact, some states have even suspended the 
practice. In 2018, around 60 percent of those deported from Germany to 
Afghanistan came from Bavaria (Tageszeitung, 2019) 
The government employs a twofold strategy to legitimize deportations. First, 
deserving and undeserving refugees are distinguished, assuming that a clear 
distinction between the two categories is possible. Those who are considered 
undeserving, and are therefore not accorded a right to stay in Germany, have to 
leave the country — if necessary, by being deported. Second, it is asserted that 
Afghanistan is safe for deportees. According to this reasoning, the unrelenting 
enforcement of returns, deportations included, is the basis for the acceptance of 
the law of asylum in Germany. In order to mark undeserving asylum seekers, a 
new vocabulary has been coined that largely replaces the earlier ‘bogus asylum 
seekers’ and ‘economic refugees’. Now, the Straftäter (criminals), Gefährder 
(potential terrorists) and hartnäckige Identitätsverweigerer (persons who 
persistently refuse to clarify their identity by withholding documents, or who 
are unsuccessful in procuring documents) exemplify those who do not deserve 
protection, who pose a danger to the German society and who therefore have to 
be deported —  even if they may suffer harm in the country to which they are 
returned. According to the current logic of integration, such people have 
refused to integrate by violating the rules of Zusammenleben (living together) 
in Germany.  
It is easy to challenge the two arguments. The distinction between deserving 
and undeserving persons is quite malleable, but it is obvious that many of the 
deportees are actually deserving in terms of the German discourse of 
integration, in that they have jobs or are undergoing professional training (if 
they have received the permit to do so), they have learned the German language 
and many of them have family in the country. The government’s emphasis that 
non-integrated, undeserving refugees have to leave does not allow the 
conclusion that those who are integrated are allowed to stay. On the contrary, 
quite often deportees are arrested at schools or workplaces, perhaps also 
because it is much easier to apprehend ‘well-integrated’ persons, who follow 
their daily routine, than absconders. The assertion that Afghanistan is safe is 
problematic that it should not merit further debate — even a cursory glance at 
the news from Afghanistan should be sufficient to prove it wrong. The fact that 
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Afghanistan, Kabul included, is unsafe, particularly for deportees, has been 
convincingly shown by Friederike Stahlmann (2019).10  
In order to fully comprehend the issue of forced migrations, it is of vital 
significance to understand the Bavarian focus on deportations in the context of 
Bavarian (and German) interior politics. For decades now, asylum politics has 
been a very hot topic in Germany, and right-wing mobilization has been a 
standard result of increasing numbers of refugees and immigrants.11 The early 
1990s, when large numbers of refugees from the Balkan wars traveled to 
Germany, were notorious for racist attacks on immigrants, some of them with 
deadly results, as well as for electoral gains in favor of extreme right and racist 
parties. However, the refugees arriving in summer 2015 were positively 
welcomed by a considerable section of German society (Sökefeld, 2017). All 
over the country, many initiatives were set up to support these refugees, and 
many Germans became engaged in such commitments to solidarity. Among 
them were many who had never been in touch with refugees before, and support 
for refugees became a booming sector of civil engagement in the country. Yet, 
at the same time, right-wing groups started to mobilize against refugees, 
referring to what they considered the ‘foreign infiltration’ and particularly the 
‘Islamization’ of the country by the refugees. When it became apparent that a 
newly established right-wing party, the ‘Alternative for Germany’ (Alternative 
für Deutschland; AfD), was able to capitalize on this movement, the federal 
government shifted from a position of welcoming the refugees to a position of 
much more control and restriction, in particular by initiating packages of more 
restrictive laws of asylum. The Bavarian party Christian Social Union (CSU), 
which for decades has held the government of Bavaria and was also a part of 
the coalition heading the federal government, took a particular lead in this 
initiative. The CSU is a conservative party with a Christian background, and its 
leaders feared that pro-refugee policies would alienate many of their 
conservative voters, who then might shift their support to the AfD. Especially 
before the Bavarian elections of October 2018, the CSU took significant steps 
to boost its hardliner profile in asylum policies, by strictly enforcing 
deportations and thus intending to prevent the projected swing of voters to the 
AfD.  
Political scientist Antje Ellermann pointed out that because deportations are 
highly controversial in Western countries, frequently triggering protests and the 
                                                          
10 The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs urgently warns against travel to Afghanistan, giving 
the following details: “Whomever travels [to Afghanistan] in spite of the travel warning has to 
be aware of the danger of violence committed by terrorists or criminals, kidnapping included. 
Also, journeys organised by professional travel agencies diminish the danger of becoming a 
victim of violence or kidnapping” (translated by M.S.), retrieved from: 
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/afghanistan-
node/afghanistansicherheit/204692#content_1. Of course, this advice is meant for German 
citizens, not for deportees.  




solidarity of citizens with deportees, governments take efforts to execute them 
in a hidden and almost invisible way (Ellermann, 2009). In Germany, a public 
campaign against deportations started following the incident in 1999 when a 
deportee to Sudan died due to mistreatment by security personnel on a regular 
Lufthansa flight. Subsequently, more and more special charter carriers were 
engaged for deportations, in order to evade the public gaze. For similar reasons, 
deportees are mostly arrested at their dwellings in the early hours of the 
morning. Despite this, the great wave of volunteer support for refugees that 
arose from summer 2015 also created new visibility, as now many more citizens 
than ever before have close relations with refugees and, of course learn about 
the deportation of their mentees.  
The CSU and like-minded politicians did not take into account that their 
repressive asylum policies would estrange voters on the other side of their vote 
bank. The government is now facing a dilemma in terms of the (in)visibility of 
deportations. This is so as on the one hand, they are executed stealthily, to pre-
empt protests from refugee supporters, but on the other hand, they have to be 
made public, to placate potential right-wing voters. Many of the refugee support 
initiatives are based on Christian circles and church communities that find these 
policies increasingly unbearable. Many of the volunteers became desperate 
when the young Afghans they had supported for years, helping them to learn 
German and to overcome bureaucratic hurdles for permits for professional 
training, for instance, were suddenly apprehended and deported, producing 
shockwaves of fear among all Afghan refugees. The government increasingly 
antagonized these volunteer supporters. Before the elections, several party 
members publicly renounced their membership in the CSU in protest, with 
some moving to the liberal Green Party. In the elections, the CSU lost more 
than 10 percent of the vote, compared to the previous election, resulting in the 
party’s loss of an absolute majority in the Bavarian parliament, while the Green 
Party gained almost 9 percent (Spiegel Online, 2018b). The Green Party won 
around 170,000 votes from erstwhile CSU voters (Welt Online, 2018), a 
development that a few years earlier would have been completely 
unimaginable. Commentators concluded that the CSU had indeed lost many of 
its more liberal and Christian supporters due to its uncompromising politics of 
asylum (Süddeutsche Zeitung Online, 2018b).  
Protesting and Resisting Deportations 
On 31 May 2017, police entered a vocational college in Nuremberg, in order to 
arrest Asif N, a 20-year-old Afghan, for deportation. While Asif did not resist 
and entered the police car to be driven away, a group of his fellow students who 
realized what was going on sat down in front of the car, to prevent its departure. 
More and more students joined, and over the following hours, more than 300 
supporters joined the protest. Violent clashes with the police followed, with 
pepper spray and batons employed along with the detention of some of the 
protestors. After a few hours, Asif was finally taken away, while the protests 
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continued. Protestors marched to Nuremberg Foreigners Registration Office. 
Civil society organizations and the political opposition vehemently criticized 
the police for removing a person from a classroom, and a trade union 
condemned the ‘inhuman’ approach of the Bavarian government (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung Online, 2017b; Spiegel Online, 2017c). Authorities had planned to put 
Asif on the deportation flight that was later called off due to the bombing of the 
German embassy in Kabul. The Foreigners’ Registration Office wanted to 
detain him, pending later deportation, but he was released in line with a court 
decision the following day (Süddeutsche Zeitung Online, 2017c).  
This was probably the most high-profile protest against the deportation of an 
Afghan from Bavaria, but it was by no means the only attempt to prevent 
removal. In recent years, a multifaceted set of initiatives and activists engaged 
against deportations to Afghanistan has developed in Bavaria. According to 
studies on voluntary commitments, such engagement for refugees has 
multiplied and diversified since 2015. Ulrike Haman and Serhat Karakayalı 
(2016) point out that the ‘summer of migration’ dramatically changed the 
composition of volunteers in Germany; on average, volunteers engaging with 
refugees have become older, and more and more people in rural areas and 
smaller towns are helping, while before such commitments had been 
concentrated in bigger cities. The authors interpret this as the normalization of 
engaging with refugees. While before 2015, the slogan ‘Refugees Welcome’ 
and campaigns against deportation were largely limited to leftist activists and 
some more or less spontaneous political initiatives organized by refugees 
themselves (Danielzik & Bendix, 2017), it now became part of a mainstream 
‘welcome culture’. Most of the new volunteers who started to engage with 
refugees in 2015 had more of a humanitarian than an explicitly political agenda. 
Their main aim was to assist the local ‘integration’ of the newly arrived 
migrants in their villages, towns, and cities, but they sought to prevent friction 
and local conflicts. Their commitments did not challenge the political 
framework of the German asylum and immigration system, in contrast, for 
instance, to the activists of anti-racism networks like ‘Kein Mensch ist illegal’ 
(no human being is illegal) or ‘No Border’, who demand the abolition of border 
controls and consider the freedom of movement a universal human right. 
Yet, while both federal and Bavarian state governments publicly call for the 
integration of refugees, emphasizing the need for them to learn the German 
language and to undergo training in order to prepare them for the labor market, 
the administration in Bavaria is very restrictive in giving work and training 
permits to refugees whose applications for asylum have been rejected. Rejected 
asylum seekers are instead expected – or, forced — to leave the country. For 
many volunteers, however, the legal distinction between a refugee and a 
rejected asylum seeker does not make much sense, since they know their 
mentees as persons who need support, who want to stay and who are eager to 
‘integrate’. Many employers also wish to employ rejected asylum seekers, 
because in many economic sectors the workforce has become very sparse.  
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The contradiction between the government’s integration rhetoric and the actual 
practice of deportation triggers protest and action in support of deportees. These 
are cases of person-centered protests (Probst & Bader, 2018) and do not imply 
any fundamental challenge to the logic of the German asylum system, as they 
largely take for granted the distinction of deserving and non-deserving 
refugees. However, such protests signal serious estrangement from a 
government that is perceived as not honoring its own principles — or rather, as 
using such principles as a smokescreen to hide a dirty practice of almost 
indiscriminate deportation. By protesting and appealing on behalf of Afghans 
who are arrested at their schools or who are taken out of their professional 
training placements and workplaces, volunteers affirm the paradigm of 
deservingness and its concomitant logic of integration. This logic is ratified by 
the volunteers’ emphasis that a particular Afghan on the verge of being 
deported is, in fact, ‘well-integrated’ and therefore deserves to stay.  
Besides volunteers, employers also assert the usefulness of their Afghan 
employees if they are threatened by deportation. The Bavarian Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce sometimes supports such Afghan employees (or rather 
their employers), but this happens through political backchannels and is not 
made public. Activist organizations such as the Bavarian Refugee Council use 
similar channels with individual politicians to save specific Afghans from 
deportation. After the Bavarian elections of 2018, having lost its majority in the 
state parliament, the CSU had to form a coalition government with the regional 
party Freie Wähler (‘Free Voters’). In their election manifesto, Freie Wähler 
had vowed to review the strict deportation program of the Bavarian 
government, and so holding them to their word, activists now regularly 
approach them in the case of ‘integrated’ deportees; “If by such means, we get 
one or two Afghans off each deportation flight, we have to consider this a 
success”, reported a member of the Bavarian Refugee Council (Personal 
Communication, Stephan Dünnwald). 
In addition to emphasizing an Afghan’s deservingness and ‘integration’, 
pointing to the heightened vulnerability of particular persons is the most 
promising strategy to avert deportation by political means. In early November 
2019, for instance, Hossein A., a mentally handicapped and ill person who had 
arrived in Germany in 2010, was taken into custody for deportation. Hossein 
had a brother and an uncle in Munich, but no family in Kabul. His mother lived 
in Iran. A petition to the Hardship Commission of the Bavarian Parliament was 
lodged on his behalf, but it was rejected by a majority vote of CSU and Freie 
Wähler Members of Parliament on the day of his imminent deportation. Only 
immediately before the deportation flight’s departure, and after many protest 
appeals, did the Bavarian Minister of Interior Affairs (CSU, too) cancel Hossein 
A’s immediate deportation (Bayerischer Flüchtlingsrat, 2019). 
14 
Conclusion 
Forced migration is normally conceptualized as the movement of people 
unsettled by some violent conflict to a place where they seek refuge. An 
important question to answer is that ‘Can a reverse forced migration; from the 
place where people have sought refuge back to the place from which they have 
fled, also be perceived? Is deportation a kind of forced migration too? It has 
been argued in this article that deportation is today much less a result of legal 
procedure, conforming with the international law of refugee protection, than of 
political imperatives intended for the fulfillment of various pursuits such as to 
placate right-wing anti-refugee demands. Deportation is rarely voluntary, and 
in the case of deportations to Afghanistan, the force in deportation is also not 
mitigated by heightened diligence in the legal-political procedures that result in 
deportation. Furthermore, it is argued that the aforementioned cannot just 
simply be regarded as a juridical question. While deportations may be legally 
established, deportees’ supporters who protest and write petitions and appeals 
consider them as illegitimate.  
That deportation is a form of involuntary removal is beyond question, and yet 
there are also programs for the state-assisted ‘voluntary return’ of failed asylum 
seekers to their countries of citizenship. The ‘voluntariness’ of such return is 
highly disputable too. For most returnees, it is simply the last opportunity to 
escape the compulsion of deportation and to evade the specific hardships that 
come with this particular course of action (Dünnwald, 2013; Feneberg, 2019). 
Afghans do not use this opportunity frequently; in 2018, only 403 Afghans 
moved from Germany to Afghanistan under this program,12 while in early 2019 
18,568 of them were forcibly obligated to leave the country (‘vollziehbar 
ausreisepflichtig’)13. Thus, most Afghans without legal status in Germany are 
not deported, but this does not mean that they are — or feel — safe. On the 
contrary, their deportability (De Genova, 2002) looms over them, creating the 
utmost uncertainty and insecurity.  
Some feel unable to withstand this uncertainty. In summer 2019, Asif N., the 
young Afghan whose deportation was prevented by his fellow students in May 
2017, ‘returned’ to Afghanistan (Nordbayern, 2019a). In an interview, he 
conveyed that he had no longer been able to withstand waiting. He was neither 
allowed to work nor to undergo training since his initial arrest, and his second 
asylum application had been rejected and that he would have to wait months or 
years again for the appeal. He gave up. When asked why he left Germany, he 
said, “[In Afghanistan] I can do what I want, without permits. I do not have to 
go to the authorities, time and again. I am simply there. In Afghanistan, one 
dies once, you know — in Germany, you die every day because of stress. Many 
say there is peace in Germany, in Afghanistan there is war. But Germany is like 
a cemetery for me; you simply lie there but you cannot do anything, you cannot 
12 In the first six months of 2019, numbers went down to 138 persons (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2019).  
13 MIGAZIN, 2019.  
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move.” When asked if he planned to return voluntarily? He said, “No”, 
emphasizing, “I do not go there voluntarily. Here I am helpless and I cannot 
pass my life here without anything. They force me. For me, this is a new flight. 
I go back to a country where I fled when I was 13 years old. Return means that 
you go to your city, to your family and friends. But I cannot go to my family. I 
have never been to Kabul. This is not a voluntary return; it is a new escape 
route. I flee from the crap system here” (Nordbayern, 2019b, translation MS).  
Asif could have stayed in Germany for the time being, waiting for his eventual 
deportation, but instead, balancing potential danger in Kabul and his actual 
situation in Germany, he preferred to leave, as he could no longer bear the 
uncertainty and the paralyzing asylum system. For sure, although he was not 
physically forced to leave by being but on a plane in handcuffs, his departure 
was not voluntary. He felt forced. In his case, the German asylum-system 
proved effective in creating a situation that drove him out of the country before 
the actual force of deportation had to be used.  
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